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BOOK
REVIEWS
On the Brink. The Great Lakes in the 21st Century. By Dave Dempsey.
East Lansing, Michigan State University Press, 2004. Pp. 304. $24.95
paper.
The Great Lakes are one of the most important resources of the
United States. They provide opportunities for both recreation and
commerce. They also are an important freshwater supply and a habitat
for numerous species. Recently, a number of concerns about the Great
Lakes have arisen. These include the damaging impacts of invasive
species such as the zebra mussel' and discussions about possibly
transferring Great Lakes water to the West. 2 This review examines On the
Brink: The Great Lakes in the 21st Century, by Dave Dempsey, to draw
lessons about what we can do to protect the Great Lakes. In this book,
Dempsey recounts a long history of mismanagement of the Great Lakes,
along with stories of individuals who took responsibility for protecting
the lakes. Through this history, we learn the necessity of adopting an
ecosystem approach. Dempsey also motivates individuals to participate
in the improvement of the lakes. We also see the importance of
institutions in the design, implementation, and enforcement of policies to
improve the Great Lakes.
The Ecosystem Approach to Managing the Great Lakes
One primary theme is that decisions about managing the Great
Lakes must use an "ecosystem approach." 3 Dempsey defines an
ecosystem approach as one

1. DAVE DEMPSEY, ON THE BRINK: THE GREAT LAKES IN THE 21ST CENTURY 144-45
(2004).

2. See GREAT LAKES COMMISSION ADVISOR, Winter 2006, at 1, available at http://www.
glc.org/advisor/06/advisor-winterO6.pdf (discussing the agreement to prevent such "outof-basin" transfers). See also JOSEPH L. SAX ET AL., LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES 207
(3rd ed. 2000) (citing Robert H. Abrams, Setting Regional Policy on Diverting Great Lakes
Water to the Arid West: Scaling Down the Myths, WAYNE LAW., Fall 1982: "From a Great
Lakes perspective, however, the enormity of Western water desires appears almost trivial.
Unlike other regions of the nation, the reservoir capacity of the Great Lakes is not
measured in acre-feet or even millions of acre feet. Great Lakes capacity is measured in
cubic miles... .The average flow of the Detroit River is roughly ten times that of the mighty
Colorado. If the Central Arizona Project were allowed to draw its full capacity of water
from Lake Michigan, it would lower the level of Lake Michigan-Huron.. .by only 2 3/4
inches. In contrast, the long-term natural fluctuation of the level of Lake Michigan exceeds
five and one-half feet.").
3. DEMPSEY, supranote 1, at 179.
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considering humans as part of a complex natural system
that includes air, water, land and other living things;
addressing the decline of the lakes holistically; considering
the possibility of unanticipated consequences from
proposed actions; and dealing with the problems of the
ecosystem by addressing their causes rather than treating
4
symptoms.
Under this approach, "'maintenance of the ecosystem depends upon the
consistency of man-made standards, laws and boundaries with those
that have evolved through natural processes. '"' 5
Dempsey offers compelling examples in which individual
decisions about managing the lakes led to significant detrimental
consequences because policy makers failed to appreciate the full effects
on the ecosystem of the lakes. For example, Dempsey recounts how the
construction of numerous canals and waterways has led to the
detrimental6 introduction of numerous exotic species into the lakes.
In the nineteenth century, there were many plans to make the
7
Great Lakes "a major thoroughfare for commerce and settlers."
However, in many places, the lakes themselves were not directly
connected with each other. To reduce the cost of transporting vessels
between the lakes, the construction of numerous canals and other
waterways was proposed. These proposals continued on into the
twentieth century, culminating in the St. Lawrence Seaway project,
completed around 1959.8
While the construction of these interconnecting waterways did
aid commerce, they also had other unintended effects. Previously, the
separation between the lakes enabled containment of exotic species.
However, the construction of these interconnecting waterways provided
new means of access to the lakes. Exotic species could cling to the sides
of vessels traversing the waterways, stowaway in ballast that otherwise
might have been dumped, or swim themselves through the canals.9
One of the most troublesome exotic species introduced as a
result is the zebra mussel, which was "first detected in the lakes in great
numbers in 1988."10 Zebra mussels present problems because they
4. Id. at 188.
5. Id. at 168 (citing Lynton K. Caldwell, The Ecosystem as a Criterionfor Public Land
Policy, 10 NAT. RESoURCES. J. 206 (1970).
6. Some may say catastrophic.
7. DEMPSEY, supra note 1, at 134.
8. Id. at 139-40.
9. Id. at 141-46, 198-99.
10. Id. at 144.
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"reproduc[e] rapidly and copiously" and cling to water pipes."
Dempsey recounts different stories of zebra mussels' effects on water
pipes. In one, "thirty tons of mussels clogged the intake pipe at an
Ontario drinking water plant." 12 In another, mussels forced closure of a
drinking water plant in Michigan for three days, in addition to forcing a
"nearby electric utility plant.. .to reduce its power generation because the
mussels coated the pipes." 13 A Newsweek article described the situation
thus:
It may lack the girth of the Blob or the menacing chirp of
Hitchcock's birds, but the zebra mussel is staging a classic
creep-show routine on the western shores of Lake
Erie .... The prolific mollusks are now entombing boat hulls
and beaches, disrupting a large fishing industry and
clogging waterlines that support cities and factories. Unless
the invasion is stopped, experts speculate, 26 million
people could lose their water supplies ....The voracious
youngsters have increased water clarity threefold-but
they've done it by grabbing up the plankton and algae that
14
support the rest of the aquatic food chain.
As a result, zebra mussels were a "potential villain for the decline in
numerous [fish] species."' 5 This put the "sport and remaining
commercial fisheries of the lakes...at risk."16
In tales such as these, 17 Dempsey demonstrates the dangers of
making decisions about managing the Great Lakes without adequately
understanding the multitude of effects that one change may have on the
entire ecosystem of the lakes. He also points out that "the ecosystem
concept slowly began to win a public constituency, in part because each
18
pollution problem solved seemed only to lead to the next."

11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 145.
14. Id. (citing Marauding Mollusks Terrorize Great Lakes, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 20, 1989, at
66).
15. Id. at 198 (discussing one theory suggesting that the mussel might be responsible
for an extreme reduction in the population diporeia, which serves as food for whitefish,
alewifes, and other fish species).
16. Id.
17. Another story is that of the Asian carp, which, after being "introduced to the
southern United States to control algal blooms and snail populations, "escaped
confinement during floods in the early 1990s and headed up the Mississippi River," id. at
243.
18. Id. at 167.
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Inspirational Stories of the Power of Individuals in Protecting the
Lakes
The other main theme of this book is that individuals can make a
difference in protecting the Great Lakes. Throughout the text, Dempsey
offers colorful narratives of individuals taking it upon themselves to
protect the Lakes, and succeeding. 19 In one of these narratives, Bess
Sheahan "lobbied untiringly for a national and then a state reserve" 20 for
the Indiana Dunes. Eventually, the effort was successful, as the Indiana
Legislature approved a bill for a Dunes state park. However, this effort
drained her, and she then "retired from active advocacy for the dunes." 2'
She wrote, "'The people here all gave up the struggle; seemed I was the
only one who stuck. Had I known how discouraged the others were I
guess I would have given up too.'" 22
Dempsey emphasizes these stories of individuals because he
believes that the solution to the proper management of the Great Lakes
lies with common citizens. In telling the story of Gilbert Pugliese, who
refused to send wastes from his mill into the Cuyahoga River in the
1960s, Dempsey includes this quote from Pugliese himself: "'When you
read and hear about all the pollution and industries don't seem to be
taking heed but go on stalling and alibiing and getting permits from
authorities, well, then you feel there is only one alternative ....
That's the
people.'"23
A similar sentiment is echoed in the closing three sentences of
the book: "There are signs that the people, if not the governments, have
the capacity to learn from this history and have learned from it. Now it is
time for them to instruct their governments on how to do so. If they act,
they can show the world." 24 These two principle themes are therefore
used to motivate people to take action. The theme of mismanagement
stirs people, and then the theme of the individual success stories gives
them confidence. In doing so, Dempsey is explicitly appealing to our
emotions. In making Great Lakes policy, Dempsey quotes Lana Pollack
19. See, for example, Dempsey's narrative of "Diana of the Dunes," id. at 88-93
(recounting the tale of "Diana," Alice Mable Gray, who fought for a national park in the
Indiana Dunes, in addition to "shedding clothes to skinny-dip" in the Lake, and causing
"rumors that she almost magically disappeared at the approach of visitors"); and "Johnny
Biosphere," id. at 187-93 (recounting the tale of "Johnny," J.R. Vallentyne, who used drinks
from a whisky bottle to emphasize his testimony before the International Joint Commission
for the Great Lakes).
20. Id. at 80-81.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 126 (emphasis added).
24. Id. at 276 (emphasis added).
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of the Michigan Environmental Council: "'There's nothing wrong with
emotion and there's nothing wrong with an emotional connection to the
Great Lakes."' 2 Dempsey goes on to state, "Protecting the Great Lakes in
the end will depend not just on how people feel about them, but how
strongly they feel, and how willing they are to fight for them." 26
The Role of Institutions in Managing the Lakes
This emphasis on the role of individuals comes at the cost of less
emphasis on the role institutions should play in proper management of
the lakes. Implementation of an ecosystem approach for managing the
lakes is infeasible for a single individual. Instead, the complexity of the
ecosystem approach -a complexity suggested by the complex definition
of the approach that Dempsey offers above - requires coordination of the
efforts of a multitude of specialists. Institutions are therefore required to
adopt an ecosystem approach.
Furthermore, institutions are required simply because we need
to organize a long-term approach to improving the Great Lakes and,
when improved, maintaining them in pristine quality. One problem with
a focus on individuals is that individuals eventually will end their
commitment to the management of the lakes. As noted above, even the
"tireless" advocate Bess Sheahan grew weary and retired from advocacy
after she had achieved her primary objective of having the Indiana
legislature create a park. When it comes to protecting the lakes, there will
not be any defined endpoint at which all interested individuals can
retire. Instead, an evolving commitment is required, and that
commitment can be provided by institutions.
Dempsey himself does recognize the need for institutions. These
institutions are necessary to create policies, implement them, and enforce
them. 27 In his description of the Bi-national Program to Restore and
Protect the Lake Superior Basin,28 Dempsey offers an example of the folly
of creating a policy that is not effectively implemented. American and
Canadian governments "hailed the agreement as a breakthrough and a
demonstration of agreement." 29 However, difficulties in interpreting the

25. Id. at 265.
26. Id. at 267 (emphasis added).
27. For more on this classification of institutions, see Dale B. Thompson, Beyond BenefitCost Analysis: Institutional Transaction Costs and the Regulation of Water Quality, 39 NAT.
RESouRCEs J. 517 (1999)
28. DEMPSEY, supra note 1, at 203-05.
29. Id. at 203.
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actual text of the agreement meant that the commitment "'was so vague
as to be meaningless. '"' 3
Dempsey offers another episode where the goals of protecting
the Great Lakes are frustrated when a policy is inadequately enforced. In
the 1990s, the budget of the environment ministry of Ontario was cut by
"more than 40 percent while slashing the agency's staff by a third." 31 As
a result, "'Monitoring and enforcement of [environmental] violations
have been lax," 32 and Dempsey connects this lack of enforcement with
"drinking water disaster[s]" in Milwaukee and Walkerton, Ontario. 33
Recognizing this need, Dempsey calls for the "invention of
institutions likely unseen before anywhere on the planet."34 A critical
task of these institutions would be to collect "good data to evaluate the
progress - or slippage - of the ecosystem." 35
Problems of Polarized Dialogue: Symbolic Politics and Overreaching
While Dempsey does discuss institutions somewhat, they
deserve even more attention in discussions of Great Lakes policy. This
relative lack of attention seems to derive from a distrust of government
and business interests, and these interests' historical role in institutional
processes. Perhaps the biggest weakness of this book is a few portions
where Dempsey interjects an attitude toward government and business
interests that is entirely too one-sided. Sometimes, Dempsey uses
inflammatory language in describing business and government interests.
For instance, on the last page of the book, Dempsey writes, "Shameproof governments captured by exploitative industries often betray the
lakes in quiet defiance of the public." 36
Statements such as these are unnecessary. The narratives offered
by Dempsey display with clarity, time and time again, the ineptitude of
our mismanagement of the Great Lakes. Moreover, this attitude can lead
to the frustration of the very goals Dempsey is trying to achieve. This
attitude leads to polarized dialogue in the political arena. There is no
middle ground here, only a call for "uncompromising recommenddations." 37 Unfortunately, polarized political dialogue sometimes leads
to two things that will frustrate the goals of its advocates: symbolic
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id. at 204.
Id. at 210.
Id. at 211.
Id.
Id. at 244.
Id. at 249.
Id. at 276.
Id. at 252.
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politics and overreaching. Dempsey himself offers episodes where these
did occur in the context of the Great Lakes.
Symbolic politics is when politicians support programs that look
like they are addressing issues - and so it makes them look good - while
at the same time these programs are actually ineffective at solving
underlying problems. Dempsey notes:
Beginning in the 1980s politicians repeatedly and
successfully crafted new laws and programs that sounded
reassuring but failed to protect the lakes. On closer
examination, most of these initiatives proved to be riddled
with exemptions, gaping with loopholes, and either
unenforceable or not intended to be fully implemented. Yet
their enactment or proclamation would, for a time, satisfy a
concerned public that something meaningful had been
done .... This.. .is a result of an intention to quiet public
concern, as much as it is a result of a balancingof the interests
of commerce and the environment.38
As examples of symbolic politics, Dempsey points to the
program to address zebra mussels, which was significantly weakened by
an exemption for ships that "reported they had no ballast on board
(NOBOB) after pumping." 39 He also points to the Bi-national Program to
Restore and Protect the Lake Superior Basin, discussed above and below,
as an example of another program that sounded good in principle, but
led to no specific steps because it was "'so vague as to be
meaningless. '"' 40
Another outcome of polarized political dialogue can be
overreaching. Overreaching is when a policy is so extreme that, upon its
implementation (or attempted implementation), it is determined that the
policy is so infeasible that it must be repealed quickly. One instance of
overreaching described by Dempsey is the Lake Superior demonstration
zone policy. In its 1990 report, the International Joint Commission (the
dominant Great Lakes policy venue at the time) "challeng[ed] the United
States and Canada to make Lake Superior a 'demonstration zone' for the
concept of zero discharge of persistent, bioaccumulative toxic
chemicals." 41 Industrial interest groups reacted with alarm to this
recommendation. One advocate stated, "'There's always the potential
that you are precluding beneficial economic activity in the mistaken
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

201 (emphasis added).
199.
204.
185.
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belief that it's necessary to protect the environment."' 42 Nonetheless, it
initially seemed that the recommendations would be adopted by federal,
state, and provincial governments.
Following up on these recommendations, in 1991 the
governments of the United States, Canada, Ontario, Minnesota,
Wisconsin, and Michigan signed the "Bi-national Program to Restore
and Protect the Lake Superior Basin" agreement. This agreement stated:
"The challenge to designate Lake Superior as a 'demonstration area
where no point source discharge of persistent toxic substances will be
permitted,' is accepted.... The governments will...pursue the goal of zero
43
discharge."
Included in this agreement was a commitment to "'designate all
U.S. Lake Superior basin waters as a special resource.' 44 One
environmental group advocated that this terminology was equivalent to
a term in the Clean Water Act, "outstanding national resource water." If
Lake Superior were thus designated, "any new or increased discharge of
toxins from a factory or municipal sewage point" would be prohibited
under the Clean Water Act. 45 This designation seems consistent with the
language of the agreement stating that the states would pursue the goal
of zero discharge.
However, state environmental officials were not willing to go
that far. Instead, they coined a new term, "outstanding international
resource water," which would permit "the total amount [of toxic
discharges to] increase if the plants expanded and the volume of their
discharge increased-even though this would move the lake away from
the zero discharge goal." 46 In adopting this approach rather than the
more stringent "outstanding national resource water" approach, an
official at the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency explained,
"'Declaring the lake an Outstanding National Resource Water, as the
National Wildlife Federation wants, would virtually ban any new
' 47
development anywhere in the Lake Superior basin.'
Meanwhile, the Ontario Ministry of the Environment, consistent
with the agreement, adopted a "rule requiring pulp mills to halt the
discharge of chlorine-related compounds by 2002" and a "requirement

42.
43.

Id. at 186.
Id. at 203 (emphasis added) (citing U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY AND

ENVIRONMENT CANADA, A BI-NATIONAL PROGRAM TO RESTORE AND PROTECT THE LAKE
SUPERIOR BASIN (1991)).

44.
45.

Id. at 205.
Id.

46.

Id.

47.

Id.
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that mills explain how they would reach a zero discharge goal." 48 In
response, the Ontario Forest Industries Association complained, "'We
feel that the zero goal is not environmentally justifiable and would like
to see the reference to the goal-removed from the regulation.'" 49 In
response to this complaint, the Ministry (under the government of a
different political party) revoked this rule and requirement.5 Dempsey
summarizes these developments thus: "Ecosystem integrity sounded
nice in theory, but its political and economic costs - prove[d] too high for
51
the governments to pay."
Another instance of overreaching is provided by the inclusion of
a requirement included in the Annex 2001 addendum to the 1985
"charter of principles [agreed to by the Great Lakes states] designed to
resist threats to the region's water quantity." 52 Under this requirement,
applicants for water withdrawals must "improve the water quality and
the natural resource qualities of the basin." 53 While this sounded good, it
became impossible to implement. As one of the participants explained,
"'If the states agree to the original concepts of Annex 2001 they will, in
effect, be putting their own communities in a position of having
additional water supply costs putting them at a competitive
disadvantage for potential new industrial/commercial users.' ' 54 In the
end, "Annex 2001 was colliding with domestic political realities"55 and
had to yield.
More Problems of Polarized Dialogue: Barriers to Effective
Institutions
Polarized political dialogue makes it extremely difficult to
develop effective institutions. Effective institutions must include the
participation of all affected parties. Dempsey seems suspicious of
industry participation in developing institutions. After describing an
"inclusive" approach to cleaning up "hotspots" based on "collaboration
and co-operation" among business, local government, and the general
public, Dempsey cautions,

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id. at
Id.
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at

206.

187.
236.
240.
241.
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The risk of the approach was that, by emphasizing a
process, it might play into the hands of politicians
unwilling to invest the cleanup funds or make the difficult
choices to restore the contaminated areas. Generating
meetings and reports and good feelings of cooperation,
remedial action planning had the potential to become a
way of postponing rather than making a governmental
ecosystem commitment.56
In the view of the history he recounts, Dempsey's suspicion is
justified. This history includes a long sequence of seemingly promising
policies for protecting the Great Lakes that are frustrated by inadequate
implementation, inadequate enforcement, and gaping loopholes. These
frustrations are enabled by government institutions lobbied by business
interest groups.
However, Dempsey takes his suspicion too far. In describing the
Great Lakes Commission, he seems to imply that inclusion of businesses
will lead to too high a priority for commercial interests:
[The Great Lakes Commission] organized the region's
governments to seek a multibillion dollar U.S. federal
funding commitment to protect, restore - and develop - the
lakes.
But that last verb was pivotal....On the one hand, [the
commission's] president.. .promoted stewardship as a
fundamental part of the commission's work. On the other
hand, port and shipping interests regarded the commission
as their panel and assured that protection of the lakes as an
avenue for commercial navigation got equal billing with
57
environmental concerns.
In this case, Dempsey seems to suggest that "equal billing" for
commercial interests gives them too high a priority.
Perhaps as a result of this suspicion and his seeming
unwillingness to recognize commercial interests as a fundamental
priority in managing the lakes, Dempsey recommends the creation of
institutions for managing the lake that exclude both business and
government interests., 8 In the place of the Great Lakes Commission
where business interests get "equal billing," Dempsey suggests "a

56. Id. at 272.
57. Id. at 246-47.
58. Recall that Dempsey characterizes governments as "shame-proof" and "captured
by exploitative industries," Id. at 276.
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regionwide, future-oriented Great Lakes citizens commission [that
would] slip the bonds of politics." 59 In addition, Dempsey also advocates
the creation of a "Great Lakes citizens assembly." 60 Although excluding
business and government representatives, he suggests that in this
assembly, "thousands of citizens... [would] not only.. .discuss but
also.. .decide on management of the lakes." 61 This assembly would then shift
the locus of policy making from government institutions to itself.
It is a mistake to polarize the dialogue to such a point that there
is no room for compromise, and no room for inclusion of business and
government interests. Instead, it is essential to include both business and
government interests in the institutions for properly managing the lakes,
as well as citizens and other representatives of the ecosystem approach.
If business interests are excluded while government interests are
included, the result would likely be symbolic politics, as suggested by
Dempsey's own recounting of the history of the Great Lakes.
Government interests are keenly aware of the impact of policies on
businesses, even if those businesses are not directly included in
policymaking discussions. Failure to include businesses in the
policymaking process may result in policies that sound good to
ecosystem advocates, but in the end are ineffectual because the
government will be unwilling to implement and enforce them. The
history of the Bi-national Program to Restore and Protect the Lake
Superior Basin, discussed above, provides one example where this
occurs. Dempsey offers another in describing changes to ballast
requirements: "'Even though there may be legal authority to force
retrofitting design changes on the vessels entering the Great Lakes
through the Seaway, it will remain a political impossibility to do so as
long as any such action discriminates against the Seaway trade.' ' 62 In the
end, government actions will reflect a fundamental "balancing of the
interests of commerce and the environment." 63 This is because, as even
Dempsey admits, "citizens respect the idea of development ....
In the
64
United States, at least, development per se is a good."
Meanwhile, if institutions excluded both business and
government interests, as suggested by the example of the citizens
assembly, the result would be the pinnacle in symbolic politics. This

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id. at 251-52 (emphasis added).
Id. at 253 (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 200.
Id. at 201.
Id. at 266 (emphasis added).
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assembly, in "decid[ing] on management of the lakes," 65 could craft a
wonderfully sounding policy. However, after having explicitly excluded
government interests, and by extension government power, who would
have the power to enforce this wonderfully sounding policy?
Recommendations for More Effective Institutions
Nonetheless, the inclusion of government and business interests
does not mean that Great Lakes management institutions do not need to
change. As noted before, inadequate implementation, inadequate
enforcement, and gaping loopholes have rendered most Great Lakes
policies ineffective. Different approaches are needed to make these
policies effective.
Dempsey is on the right track with many of his recommenddations. An ecosystem approach is necessary and should be part of the
institutional design. Also essential is the collection of "good data to
evaluate the progress - or slippage - of the ecosystem." 66 The best way to
ensure the effectiveness of policies is to actually measure their impacts.
While this is easier said than done, collection of reliable metrics on the
condition of the ecosystem of the Great Lakes will enable us to determine
whether a policy is actually working or not. If it is not working, the next
step should be to identify where the problem lies: is it inadequate
implementation or enforcement, or is the policy itself faulty in design?
Another critical element is to communicate this information to
the public, and to educate the public about its significance, while at the
same time learning more about the public's own knowledge and
preferences. Dempsey suggests that "regional institutions... [could]
explain the role of the various governments in Great Lakes
decisionmaking, provide updates on the actions of the many
governments affecting Great Lakes ecosystem health, and provide for
both formal and informal means of assessing public knowledge and
attitudes." 67 With this information, the public would then be able to
provide a political check against governmental institutions that were
failing to adequately protect the Lakes.
In addition to these suggestions by Dempsey, we should also
consider integrating the different components of institutions: initial
policy making, implementation, enforcement, and compliance. One of the
recent developments in engineering practices is the use of what is known

65.
66.
67.

Id. at 253.
Id. at 249.
Id. at 252.
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as "concurrent engineering." 68 Previously, engineering projects would
typically proceed in a linear development path. For example, to create a
printed circuit board, one engineer would do an initial theoretical
design, a second engineer would do a physical layout of the board, and
then a third engineer would adapt the physical layout to manufacturing
requirements. Unfortunately, if the design were incompatible with some
of these manufacturing requirements, this would not be discovered until
the end of the process, and then the entire process would have to start
again. Under a concurrent engineering approach, issues from the back
end of this process (both layout and manufacturing) would be brought
forward to the front end (design) by enabling direct communication
among all of the engineers during the initial design process. This
approach saves both time and money.
In a similar manner, effective institutions for the Great Lakes
must bring together parties involved in all of these institutions'
components. Policy makers must consult not only with ecosystem
advocates, but also with administrative agencies responsible for
implementing and enforcing the policy, in addition to businesses that
must comply with these policies. With all of these parties together, policy
makers can then determine appropriate tradeoffs among conflicting
interests and discover effective mechanisms to achieve the desired
balancing of these interests. Thus, effective policies result from involving
all of these parties at all stages of policy making and then using data to
determine when to adapt these policies as needed.
Conclusion
On the Brink: The Great Lakes in the 21st Century by Dave
Dempsey offers a compelling history of the mismanagement of the Great
Lakes along with inspiring stories of individuals who successfully made
a difference in improving the ecosystem of the lakes. Through these
narratives, we learn the necessity of adopting an ecosystem approach.
Dempsey also motivates individuals to participate in the improvement
of the lakes.
We also see the important role that institutions play in
determining whether a policy will be effective. Initially promising
policies may have no effect if they are not followed up with adequate
implementation and enforcement. Otherwise, these policies run the risk
of being yet another example of symbolic politics, where a politician

68. My knowledge about concurrent engineering derives from a research project at
Stanford University conducted with Timothy F. Bresnahan and Elliott Levinthal.
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shows support for a program that sounds good, but ultimately fails to
address the underlying issue.
Dempsey also offers a number of suggestions for developing
effective institutions. These include the collection of data to determine
the health of the ecosystem and the communication of this information to
the public. In contrast with Dempsey, this review suggests that these
institutions also must include all parties involved: not just ecosystem
advocates, but also business and government interests. Without all of
these parties, the goal of ecosystem protection will be ultimately
frustrated. On the other hand, involving all of these parties enables
better integration of policy making, implementation, enforcement, and
compliance.
While emotions are important to motivate people to participate,
we will also need the cold calculation of data collection and the
methodical plodding of institutional building to effectively manage the
Great Lakes. Through all of these, perhaps we can serve as better
stewards of the Great Lakes for the ecosystems of now and future
generations.
Dale B. Thompson
Assistant Professor of Ethics & Business Law
College of Business
University of St. Thomas
St. Paul, Minnesota
Pricing Irrigation Water Principles and Cases from Developing
Countries. By Yacov Tsur, Terry Roe, Rachid Doukkali & Ariel Dinar.
Washington, DC: Resources for the Future Press, 2004. Pp. 320. $65.00
hardcover.
Pricing Irrigation Water provides the reader with an extensive
literature review followed by the theoretical principles of irrigation
water demand and supply and an application of this theory to case
studies in Morocco, China, Mexico, South Africa, and Turkey. Particular
emphasis is given by the authors to the policy implications of alternative
strategies for pricing irrigation water.
There are four aspects of this book that distinguish it from the
existing large body of literature addressing the "water pricing" issue.
First, the authors go well beyond the standard arguments for the
"efficient" pricing of water, based on the economist's paradigm of
marginal cost pricing, to include analyses of the many pricing structures
that actually exist in the real world. Examples include average pricing,
the use of block-rate pricing, issues related to the question of "who pays
for fixed costs," the pricing of multiple sources of water with differing
quality, and volumetric pricing versus per-acre pricing. Analyses of

